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ABSTRACT
Militarization of Conservation
By
Daniel Ryan Michel
Advisor: Karen Miller
The world is facing biological diversity extinction of its wildlife solely caused by
humans. One of the leading causes of the extinction crisis is attributed to poaching and
the illegal trade of wildlife products. In search of finding suitable methods to curb the
crisis, a dichotomy of overarching solutions has arisen: those who have advocated for
community-based natural resource management and those who support militarized
conservation. The focus of this paper is to delineate which method is, if any, the most
appropriate when combatting poaching and the illegal wildlife trade. Concentrating on
elephants (both African and Asian) and the rhinoceros, two of the most threatened species
of these crimes, this paper looks at a multitude of factors gathered through past literature
to determine the best method to conserve endangered species when faced with poaching.
Community-based natural resource management, when used alone, has been shown to be
incapable of stopping the threat when foreigners and professional criminals are involved.
Although militarization of conservation is faced with a lot of critics and leaves the
possibility of corruption and human right violations to occur, militarization of wildlife
conservation has proven to be an effective method to protect animals against those who
have their mind set on breaking the law. The only solution is a more adaptive and holistic
one, which combines the two strategies of community-based natural resource
management and conservation militarization. To chastise the idea and utility of
conservation militarization is to leave an invaluable tool in the bag when combatting
those who are set on poaching and participating in the lucrative illegal wildlife trade.
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Introduction
There can be little debate that planet Earth is facing a severe biodiversity crisis.
According to the Center for Biological Diversity, in the past five hundred years, approximately
one thousand species have gone extinct. Unlike the other events of mass extinction throughout
geological history, the alarming rates of these extinctions are caused by a single species, Homo
sapiens. In the last century, the conservation of threatened animals and their habitats has been
becoming a more pressing concern for people around the world. Many researchers, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and governments have formulated and implemented various
strategies to thwart the rapid decline in biodiversity, all with varying degrees of success. One of
the strategies implemented is the use of military tactics to protect wildlife for conservation.
The militarization of conservation or “green militarization” has been on the rise in recent
years, creating a divide amongst the people. Some view it as an effective strategy while others
view it as counterproductive. The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the necessity for the
acceptance and utilization of the militarization of conservation efforts to thwart the extinction of
endangered species. Those who oppose the strategy of using militarized tactics for conservation,
mostly vehemently condemn it. They believe it alienates the surrounding communities instead of
working with them to understand the importance of a threatened species within their
geographical habitat. They advocate for a multigenerational information campaign to educate the
affected communities, providing them with knowledge of the importance of biological diversity
within their ecosystem. The fact remains that the most affected species cannot rely on a
multigenerational informational dissemination strategy alone, as they will be extinct before it
ever takes root. Those that support the use of militarization in conservation efforts see it as a vital
tool to be used and adapted in the preservation of wildlife. Realizing that a more securitized and
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forceful effort is needed to inform the local communities and global populations to get them to
change current practices, especially in the most severe cases.
Two of the biggest species threatened by humans in the way of poaching are the
elephant and rhinoceros. Though there are many other species affected by poaching around the
world, such as the majority of the big cats or pangolin, the most academically studied cases
would be that of elephants and rhinoceros. This paper will consist of six major sections. The first
two sections will be individual parts that give a brief description of each species, followed by
population and poaching numbers historically up to the most present available numbers from the
most affected countries. The next section will look at the basic economics and politics of the
countries affected by the poaching or involved in the illicit trade market. Followed by a section
that will take an in-depth typology of the poachers and traffickers with examples. Then a part
that is looking at the life threatening cost of being a park ranger tasked with protected elephants
and rhinoceros within affected countries. Finally and perhaps most importantly, a section looking
at the current laws and enforcement being used around the world to protect elephants and
rhinoceros from the poaching threat around the world. The overall intention is to prove that all
evidence points to the need to utilize a militarized strategy to prevent the extinction of species
before community outreach strategies can take hold. First, let's look at the two species that will
be the focal point of this paper.

Elephants
Elephants are the largest terrestrial mammals alive today; they can weigh from 2- 6 tons,
stand 8- 13 feet in height and live up to 70 years of age. They are among the smartest animals on
the planet. Studies have shown that elephants distinguish different characteristics in humans
voice, use tools, understand body language and have excellent memories (McComb, 2014).
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Furthermore, elephants express emotions such as empathy and grief, with the ritualistic
mourning of the dead (King, 2013; Plotnik, 2014). It is estimated that there were once more than
350 species of elephants in the world. Today, we have two genera of living elephants left:
African (Loxodonta) and Asian (Elephas). African elephants have two species, Savannah
elephants (Loxodonta africana) and Forest elephants (Loxodonta cyclotis). The main differences
between them are that the forest elephants are much smaller (sometimes referred to as the “dwarf
elephant”) and tusks are much straighter than its Savannah counterpart. The African elephant is
the larger of the two genera left in the world. They have extremely large ears, and both the males
and the females grow tusks. The Asian Elephant (Elephas maximus) has a massive body but with
ears that are smaller than those of close African relatives. The males develop tusks, but the
females do not develop tusks.
Elephants are illegally killed for a number of reasons (meat, skins, trophies and human
wildlife conflict), the majority are poached for one reason and one reason only, their tusks. The
tusks of the elephant are made out of ivory. The ivory is used to create a vast variety of objects
from small trinkets and jewelry that can range in the hundreds of dollars or one tusk, intricately
carved into a piece of art to be displayed in one’s home or office costing tens of thousands of
dollars. Owning such an “exotic” piece of art is seen, as a status symbol of upper-class taste in
Asian societies. The Asian market, more specifically China, dominates the world’s demand for
ivory. The booming Chinese middle class has caused the demand to increase tenfold (Gao,
2014). With the growth of the market, the amount of poaching around the world has also
increased, causing a dramatic drop in the elephant population. With fewer elephants, the price of
the ivory only gets higher. Creating a vicious cycle that this world has observed before, with the
human demand of wildlife products causing the extinction crisis of a different species.
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African Elephants
The African elephant once had a range that covered much of the continent, but since 1978
they have lost 50% of its territory. A population that once numbered from 3-5 million in the early
20th century, now estimates are around 415,000 in the wild (Allen, 2014). With less than 20% of
the African elephant's habitat protected, numerous governments and NGOs have implemented
specific strategies to thwart the current poaching crisis facing the country and/or national park.
The relative success of anti-poaching enforcement and conservation efforts varies across the
countries and the national parks. However, the more severe the threat becomes, the more
militarized tactics are being deployed.
Savannah Elephants
Savannah elephants are located in many countries in Africa, with the highest population
densities found in the countries of Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa, Botswana, and
Zimbabwe. The Savannah elephant population has declined by 30% (equivalent to 1444,000
individuals) from 2007-2014 and a current rate of decline of 8% a year, primarily due to
poaching (Allen, 2014). In Zambia, elephant population was estimated at 200,000 during the 70s
and 80s. In 2008 the number dramatically dropped to a
population of 26,000 elephants, according to a paper
presented by Zambian tourism and arts minister Sylvia
Masebo at illegal Wildlife Trade Conference in London
(2014). In figure (1) you can see the specifically reported
years of poached savannah elephants in Zambia.
Tanzania population in 1979 was an estimated at 316,300
individuals but dropped to just 50,500 in 2013, which is a
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Fig (1): (Kalaluka, 2014)
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loss of 84.1% of the counties entire elephant population in 34 years (Kideghesho, 2016). The
country of Kenya, which has some of the highest numbers in poached of elephants in recent
years and is a known international export hub has some staggering numbers as well. In 1973 it
was estimated that the country contained 167,000 individual elephants and only 16,000 in 1989
when the International Ivory Ban was enacted (Storey, 1994). The most recent census in 2012
estimates Kenya population at 38,000 elephants, which is an improvement from 1989 numbers,
but is still a 77.3% decrease since 1973 estimate (KWS, 2012). Increasingly concerning, is the
reported cases of poaching over the last decade in Kenya that could be seen in figure (2). South
Africa over the last 25 years has unreliable numbers of elephants poached; this is because the
only numbers available are

Kenya Elephants Poached
2005-2014 per year
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Fig (2): (KWS, 2005- 20014)

recorded poaching of an elephant. The last two years there has been a slight uptick of 22 in 2015
and 36 as of September 2016 (Oxpeckers, 2016). Nevertheless, this is dramatically less than
other countries have been recently experiencing. Zimbabwe by any measure has a positive
history of protecting and conserving its elephant population. It has been estimated that in 1900,
Zimbabwe had little more than 4000 elephants left. Today it boasts a stable population of 82,304
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individuals (Allen, 2014). Although it should be pointed out that since 2005 the northwestern
population in Zimbabwe has decreased, at the same time the southeastern population has
increased (Allen, 2014). Botswana’s population and poaching numbers are scarce, but it’s
estimated to have a stable population of 130,451 as of 2014. One notable mention is
Mozambique as it has been a crucial haven for poachers for many years. It has lost 70% of
wildlife its population since 1975 and lost 53% of the elephant population (Allen, 2014). All
other countries in Africa were left out of this section due to small elephant population and/or
unreliable censuses. Though, some will be mentioned in later sections of the paper.
Forest Elephants
Forest elephants are found in the Rainforest zone of central and west Africa. They are
located in the countries of Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African
Republic (CAR) and Cameroon in central Africa and Ghana, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire in west
Africa. Accurate numbers of forest elephants are hard to estimate for two reasons. First, the
habitat of dense rainforest makes it tough for researchers to gain actual numbers with dense
jungle canopy that make aerial surveys impossible. Census of dung piles is the basis of the
majority of population estimates but that is an unreliable way of obtaining accurate assessments
of the population (Maisels, 2013). Second, the majority of the countries in which they are located
intend to be some of the most dangerous and unstable countries on the entire continent of Africa.
Over the last several decades the population of forest elephants was estimated to have dropped
from 700,000 to 100,000 individuals, as well as being reduced to 25% of historic range (Maisels,
2013). One study, states the population has declined 62% from 2002- 2013. Gabon that has half
of the population left lost 25,000 elephants from 2004-2014, nearly 80% of the entire population
in one decade (Allen, 2014).
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Asian Elephants
The Asian elephant species contains three subspecies, the Indian, Sumatran & Sri
Lankan. In the early 1900’s it was estimated that there were 100,000 Asian elephants, now the
population has dropped to 40,000 -50,000 with 40% living in captivity (Sukumar, 2004). Living
only 15% of its original range, the Asian elephant only rides in the countries of Laos, Vietnam,
Nepal, India, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand and Sri Lanka. Out of all the subspecies left, the
Indian accounts for the majority of the population and the widest range. The Sumatran has lost
70% of habitat, and the Sri Lankan lives in fragmented populations on parts of the island (WWF,
2017). In recent years, Asian elephants are not poached as much as African elephants as stated
earlier. Only the males are poached; this is because only the males have tusks. Males with tusks
led to the cultivation of a genetic mutation among the male population that has seen the
proliferation of a tuskless males gene (Kurt, 1995). Also, Asian elephants are captured for trade
and the logging industry more than poached throughout Asia. In India, a mere 22,00 Asian
elephants live in the wild (Sukumar,

India Elephants Poached
2006-2015 per year

2004). However, among ivory
carvers it is said that Asian ivory is
of higher quality. Legal & illegal
hunting has taken a dramatic effect
on the population of elephants within
the country. India is one of the only
countries to provide numbers of
poached elephants, which can be
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Fig (3); (WPSI, 2015)

seen in figure (3). Which is relatively low when comparing it to the African elephant.
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Rhinoceros
The there are four extant genera of rhinoceros in the family Rhinocerotidae that exist
today: White rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum), Black rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis), Indian/
Javan rhinoceros (Rhinoceros) and Sumatran rhinoceros (Dicerorhinus sumatrensis). The word
rhinoceros means “nose horn” which is the most significant and odd feature of this animal
family. It is also the reason that they are illegally hunted and killed for financial gain. The
rhinoceros horn has a high demand in the black market of Asia, more so than the ivory produced
by the elephant. The horn is used for ornamental means, similar to the utilization of ivory, and it
also has a much bigger market in the traditional medicinal use of it within Asian folklore
medicine. They use the horn for a variety of reasons, but the most popular one is to cure cancer.
It has been reported that ground up horn material is used to make wine or a drink for an
aphrodisiac, which denotes a sign of sophisticated taste and status (Hübschle, 2016). The horn
has a going price of $60,000 per kilogram on the illegal black market. The horn is made out of
keratin, which is the same protein that the human fingernail or hair is made out of. All of these
uses for the horn are unfounded. There has been no clinical evidence that the use of rhinoceros
horn has any medicinal use or beneficial properties to promote health (Milliken, 2012).
White Rhinoceros
The white rhinoceros has two extant subspecies alive today, the northern white rhino
(Ceratotherium simum simum) and the southern white rhino (Ceratotherium simum cottoni). The
northern white rhino no longer lives in the wild, with only three left living in captivity today, one
male and two female. They reside at the Ol Pejeta Conservancy in Kenya. The southern white
rhinoceros was once estimated to number less than 100 in 1895, it now has the highest
population and largest range of all the rhinoceros left today in the world (Milliken, 2012).
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Successful management and conservation of the southern white rhino increased the populations
to an estimated 21,177 animals in 2015. South Africa contains a little over 93% of the remaining
population. They have been reintroduced in Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe after the
native populations went extinct, as well as being introduced in Kenya and Namibia to bolster
conservation efforts (Emslie, 2012).
Black Rhinoceros
The black rhinoceros had four subspecies in existence up to 2011 when the West African
black rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis longipes) were declared extinct. The remaining three
subspecies: south central (Diceros bicornis minor), south-western (Diceros bicornis bicornis)
and East African (Diceros bicornis michaeli) had a combined population of 2,475 animals in
1993. However, with effective conservation, the numbers have bounced back to around 5000
animals. The remaining residents live in a fragmented habitat, with 98% residing in the four
countries of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Kenya and South Africa (Emslie, 2012).
Poaching of White & Black Rhinoceros
The white and black rhinoceros have overlapping ranges and often the poaching numbers
are combined or not delineated between the two species when reporting poaching incidents. For
that reason, this section will be a combined section of the reported numbers from specific
countries of both animals. From 2004 - 2014 Namibia reported 103 rhinoceros were poached in
time frame. The following two-years had seen a dramatic increase of 24 in 2014 and 80
rhinoceros poached in 2015, only to slightly drop to 60 in a final report of 2016 (Republic of
Namibia 2017). Another country that has seen a spike in the poaching of rhinoceros is the
country of Kenya, after having some success in increasing numbers of the black rhinoceros in
recent years. Then again, the numbers of poached animal over the last decade are not
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encouraging as seen in figure (4).

Kenya Rhinos Poached
2006-2015 per year
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any other country in the world. From 1990 -2009 the country of South Africa only reported 379
rhinoceroses poached. Then in 2010, there was a spike to 333, almost eclipsing the amount that
had occurred over the previous decade (Milliken, 2012). Since, then, the numbers have only
increased significantly as shown in figure (5), only to decline slightly this year. However, in
2016 a total of 1054 rhinos were illegally hunted and killed (Molewa, 2017). South Africa is
ground zero for the poaching war on rhinos, and if numbers do not drastically decrease, they
soon might find themselves with minimal populations like neighboring countries in Africa.
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Fig (5): (Emslie, 2010; Milliken, 2012; ZA DEA, 2015- 2017)
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Sumatran, Javan and Indian Rhinoceros
Two out of the three species of rhinoceros that home range is in Asia are critically
endangered. One of those critically endangered species is the Sumatran rhinoceros. It is
estimated that to only 100 animals currently live in Borneo and Sumatra. The Sumatran
rhinoceros possibly only has one subspecies alive today in the wild (van Strien, 2008). The
eastern Sumatran rhino (Dicerorhinus sumatrensis harrissoni) was declared extinct in the wild
by Masidi Manjun, the Tourism and Environment Minister, in 2015 (Hance). Then again, one
was captured in 2016 to provide evidence that some may still survive in the wild (Howard,
2016). The western Sumatran rhino (Dicerorhinus sumatrensis sumatrensis) is the only known
Sumatran rhino that lives in the wild, which has only 75-85 animals that reside in two national
parks in Sumatra (van Strien, 2008). Both of these subspecies were hunted for the same reason
those in Africa were, just the Sumatran is considerably closer to extinction. The Javan rhinoceros
or lessor one- horn
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survives in Ujung Kulon National Park in Java, Indonesia (Save the Rhino, 2017). In
comparison, the Javan’s closest relative is doing better than all other Asia dwelling rhinoceros
combined. The Indian rhinoceros or the greater one-horn rhino (Rhinoceros unicornis) once
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covered the entire northern region of the Indian subcontinent. After extensive sport hunting and
killing those that invade agricultural lands, only 600, within a much smaller range, were
estimated to exist in 1975 (Talukdar, 2008). With effective management and conservation, it is
estimated that 2,863 are alive in Nepal and India today. A census conducted in 2011
approximated that 534 Greater One-horned Rhinos are now found in Nepal; 503 of these are in
Chitwan National Park, 24 in Bardiya National Park and seven in Shuklaphanta Wildlife
Reserve. Nepal’s poaching numbers are small compared to other areas, as seen in figure (6), but
one thing that should stand out is that they have successfully claimed three zero-poached years in
the recent years (Acharya, 2012). In India, the remaining 2,329 of the population reside in the
Kaziranga National Park in India. Since anti-poaching and management efforts have increased,
poaching has been sporadic, as can be seen in figure (7), which shows the numbers over the last
decade.
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Basic Economics & Politics
Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan
The political economy of the three countries has been shaped by conflicts in the past. The
Lord Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group that has for long fought against the Ugandan
government is present in the three countries. The implication of this is that most of the resources
available to these states are directed towards resolving such conflicts rather than economic
development.
Of the three countries, Uganda presently has a significantly better political and economic
environment; however, it still feels the ills of poaching due to the proximity of its two lawless
neighbors, as well as rampant corruption in its public service.
Therefore, to an enormous extent, the poaching problems facing Uganda, other than inherently
being due to internal structural weaknesses, can also be attributed to its war torn neighbors. The
proportion of wildlife’s contribution to the economies of DRC and South Sudan is not as huge
due to conflict. However, according to Okello (2014), the lost economic potential due to
poaching in DRC, South Sudan, and Uganda is far greater due to their being landlocked,
rendering them to lose any benefits from coastal tourism.
However, the situation has created a fertile ground for the militia to engage in the poaching
business. According to a report by Born Free USA, militias in South Sudan and the DRC collude
with the military whereby the militias poach on behalf of senior and corrupt military officers in
exchange for arms and protection. Uganda emerges as a transit point for the poached game
(Committee of Foreign Relations, 2014).
The LRA sourced most of its resources from the poaching of elephants and gorillas. To
illustrate the expanse of the problem, the LRA had been active in Uganda, South Sudan, DRC,
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and the Central African Republic (CAR). Therefore, while Uganda has managed to contain some
of the conflicts with the militias, the shared borders and the underdeveloped nature of some of
these areas make adequately addressing the problem difficult (Committee of Foreign Relations,
2014).
To a vast extent, high levels of poverty in these countries especially in the rural areas
(where poaching is likely to take place) earn less per day, making them susceptible to the wishes
of rebels. Poaching takes place on a multi-level hierarchy, with those at the bottom of the chain
getting fewer returns despite the lucrative nature of the business (Duffy, 2010). Therefore, for
those at the bottom of the chain to sustain their earnings, they must increase the frequency and
volume of poached animals.
Tanzania
Tanzania is one of the countries in which wildlife tourism plays a central role in its
economy. The Wild Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) estimates that tourism and travel contribute
$5 billion to Tanzania’s economy, employing about 1.2 million people. The Selous Game
Reserve, Tanzania’s largest protected area, provides about $6 million in revenue annually
(WWF). Despite the impressive figures, Tanzania has been billed as one of the greatest sources
of game trophy in the world (Kariuki, 2014). As an illustration, the number of elephants in
Tanzania reduced from 109, 000 in 2009 to 43,000 as of 2015 (Lowry, 2016).
Tanzania is relative to a majority of poaching hotspots in the continent. It has a relatively
stable political environment and has been devoid of conflicts. Agriculture, natural resource
extraction, and wildlife tourism are the greatest contributors to the country’s economy. However,
with an estimated output per capita of $2, 500, poverty is still a primary concern in the country
(Trading Economics, 2017).
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According to Born Free USA, Tanzania’s political elite are implicated in the industrial
scale decimation of Tanzania’s wildlife population, especially the elephant and the rhino, for
their tusks and horns respectively (Kariuki, 2014). Game trophy from Tanzania often finds its
way out of the country onto the black markets of the Far East using Kenya and Uganda as transit
points. Therefore, in essence, corruption and lack of political will in the country also play a role
in encouraging the menace.
The history of poaching in Tanzania can be traced to the practice of offering hunting
licenses for legal wildlife hunting in the 1960s and 1970s. However, corruption among
government officials has created numerous flaws in the system of government issued hunting
licenses and in the long run, it has permitted the infiltration of poachers (Leader-Williams,
1993).
Poverty has also been a major contributing factor to poaching in Tanzania. The lack of
adequate employment opportunities pushes individuals, especially those in ruling communities,
into poaching (Formo, 2010). These people are at the bottom of the poaching and trafficking
chain.
Kenya
Kenya has the largest economy in the eastern Africa region. It has a per capita output of
approximately $2, 900 (Trading Economics, 2017). However, the country still faces some
challenges with regard to poverty levels and income inequality. The implication is that those
within the cadres of the income ladder are pushed to vices such as poaching (Committee of
Foreign Relations, 2014).
The difficulty in curbing poaching in Kenya is further attributed to corruption among
concerned officials as well as political affiliations with the powerful individuals in government.
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As an illustration, there have been allegations of the country’s first president Jomo Kenyatta
being involved in the trade of ivory in the past (Parker, 1974). Kenya’s ports of entry and exit
have also been used as conduits by other countries in the eastern Africa region (Vira, 2014).
Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR)
The poaching menace in Sudan and the Central African Republic is closely intertwined.
This is a result of the two countries sharing a common border as well as being engulfed in
conflicts. Conflict serves as a perfect backdrop for poachers to engage in their heinous acts.
According to a Born Free USA report, levels of poaching in Sudan have been on the rise
due to conflicts and political, as well as military infiltration, into the lucrative business.
Government allied militia in the Darfur region fund their activities by undertaking the poaching
of elephants and other wild animals (Vira, 2014). Sudanese military and political elites are
complacent to these events given that such militias are critical in ensuring their continued grip on
power. To make the situation worse, Sudanese poachers cross the borders with impunity into the
CAR, taking advantage of the conflict in the country (Kariuki, 2104).
Since 2013, the Central African Republic has been embroiled in a civil war pitting the
nation’s Muslims (Seleka rebels) against the country’s Christians (anti-Seleka militias). The state
of lawlessness in the country makes it possible for poachers to traverse the territory freely.
The trading of game trophies has spawned an entire underground economy in Sudan and
the Central African Republic. Other than the Sudanese poachers and Darfur’s militias, the Lord
Resistance Army (LRA), which has a presence in CAR, is also a major supplier of elephant ivory
to Sudan. Once acquired, the ivory is smuggled across Sudan’s border with the help of corrupt
border officials (Gettleman, 2012).
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Once inside Sudan, the Ivory is transported across the expansive western desert in Darfur
to the capital, where game trophy is sold with little consequence for the traders involved. In
essence, there is no political will in the country to fight the menace since the trade ensures the
status quo in Sudan’s power structure, maintaining the proceeds, which support the government
friendly militia (Somerville, 2013).
Gabon
In the past, wildlife conservation had not been given priority by either the Gabonese
government or its people. The cavalier attitude arose from the fact that hunting and consumption
of bush meat had been viewed as a way of life for the people of Gabon. It is particularly true
considering the nation’s extensive and unexploited equatorial forests. Furthermore, Gabon’s
wildlife, especially gorillas and the forest elephant, were believed to be protected from the
poaching menace by extensive and untapped forests whose accessibility was poor either from
land or from the air. The cavalier attitude in dealing with poaching is illustrated by the fact that
the country formed a wildlife protection agency only in 2012 (Fletcher, 2014).
However, in the recent past, the country has come to terms with the effects of poaching.
Between 2004 and 2014, about 80% of its forest elephants were poached in the country’s vast
Minkebe National Park (Morell, 2017). Gabon’s poaching menace is as much a political problem
as it is an economic problem. According to Fletcher (2014), a huge number of the local
population involved in the poaching are the Baka, formerly hunters. The Baka have suffered
political marginalization from the government for a long time. The consequence is the Baka have
been left poor, making them susceptible to the whims of poachers. The poachers prefer the Baka
because of their knowledge and mastery over the terrain.
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Secondly, Gabon has opened up its dense forests to logging and mining which has
provided an avenue for foreigners, especially the Chinese, to infiltrate the forests with superior
gear to conduct poaching (Fletcher, 2014). However, the criminal decimation of Gabon’s
wildlife takes place in large part due to complacency from government officials who benefit
directly from the illegal trade of game trophy.
Zimbabwe
Relative to many countries where poaching has been known to be a menace, Zimbabwe
has in the past been able to manage its wildlife effectively. It was primarily as a result of its
system of allowing licensed game hunting in exchange for a fee that was then channeled back
into conservation. Wildlife tourism and overall travel are estimated to contribute about 10.4% of
Zimbabwe’s GDP (Turner, 2015).
However, presently, Zimbabwe faces numerous challenges with regard to poaching. The
high demand for illegal game trophy has driven the trade in illegal ivory and rhino horn
underground, with the nation’s top political and security operatives being implicated in the trade.
In 2016, a senior officer of the country’s Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) was arrested
and charged with supplying guns and ammunitions to poachers (Rademeyer, 2016).
There are many reasons for the recent surge in poaching in Zimbabwe especially in rhino
horn and elephant tusk poaching. The political instability and rampant corruption have provided
the perfect backdrop for poaching in the country (Vira, 2014).
Moreover, the mismanagement of the economy has left many Zimbabweans poor and
unemployed, amidst high prices for basic needs. As a result, many Zimbabweans are pushed into
poaching which attracts substantive earnings due to the strong demand in the Far East (Vira,
2014).
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Zambia
Zambia’s economy is heavily dependent on the natural resource extraction, especially
copper. Zambia’s political landscape has been devoid of conflicts. However, high levels of
income inequality and mismanagement of public resources have led to a spike in the poverty rate
of the country.
Recently, things have changed. It is particularly true with regards to the banning of ivory
trading. This has forced the trade underground. Economic challenges in the country have also
served to encourage the poaching menace. The police and military officers in the county are
poorly remunerated, and their salaries often arrive late. It forces them to be complacent in the
trade by accepting bribes or lending out their weapons to poachers (Nkala, 2016).
Angola
Prior to the onset of its civil war in 1975, Angola had one of the largest herds of the
savannah elephant, alongside other wildlife. However, the civil a war that raged from 1975 to
2002 lead to the decimation of elephant and rhino populations in the country. Militias and rebels
used the proceeds from the illegal trade to purchase arms and other war supplies (Vira, 2014).
Following the end of the civil war in 2002, a period of replenishment of elephant and
rhinos began. However, there was not much political concern for wildlife at the time given that it
was a widely accepted belief that Angola sparse populations of wildlife left (Hahn, 2013).
Currently, Angola is one of the largest producers of crude oil in Africa. Oil has led to its
economy performing exemplarily well. Between 2000 and 2016, the average rate of economic
growth in Angola had been 9.38% (Trading Economics, 2017). Millions of the country’s
population has been lifted out of poverty in the process. Therefore, in Angola, the poaching
menace has been primarily as a result of a weak regulatory and enforcement regime.
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Mozambique
Mozambique has traditionally had a hands-off approach to wildlife conservation even
after the end of it’s’ civil war. Possession of illegal game trophy is merely viewed as a
misdemeanor (Save The Rhino, 2013). In essence, it suffers from weak laws and corruption
(Vira, 2014).
The consequence of this is that poaching has led to the creation of an underground
economy in the country, since it acts as a transit hub for rhino horn and elephant tusk obtained
from South Africa and Zimbabwe. The trade has seen the rise of criminal syndicates and
enrichment of political elite. Poor pay for security officers has further entrenched the vice as they
become complacent (Vira, 2014).
Botswana and Namibia
The two neighbors have historically had close ties with regard to wildlife conservation
due to the sector’s enormous contribution to their economies (Turner, 2015). The two countries
are also beneficiaries of massive precious minerals reserves that have enabled their closely
intertwined economies to grow consistently. As a result, the level of poverty in these two
countries is smaller relative to other nations affected by the poaching menace (Vira, 2014).
Secondly, there is political goodwill in both countries to fight poaching. Such efforts are largely
successful due to the highly transparent nature of both nations’ political and economic
undertakings (Vira, 2014).
India and Nepal
The economies of India and Nepal are closely intertwined with the former being one of
the largest contributors to Nepal’s economy. Therefore, despite high poverty levels in the two
countries relative to other developing nations of a similar size, the rate at which people are being
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lifted out of poverty is high compared to other countries affected by poaching (Narayan, 2009;
Pande, 2004). The result is that it creates less incentive for poaching combined with the success
of the zero tolerance to poaching in both countries. There has also been political will in both
countries to fight the menace especially the one-horned rhino that is domiciled in the area (Pulse,
2012).
Vietnam
Vietnam has become not only a major consumer of rhino horn and elephant tusks but also
a major transit point (Milliken, 2012). Both raw and processed game trophies are sold onwards to
China and Thailand. The growing consumption of the illegal trophies is a result of the growing
disposable incomes of the people of Vietnam, especially in the middle-class category (Milliken,
2012). There is also no political will from the nation’s communist rulers to crackdown on the
vice due to political patronage and corruption.
Thailand
As of 2013, the per capita output in Thailand was $5778 (Trading Economics, 2017).
This sets Thailand as being a middle-income country. The growth is primarily attributed to its
export-led economy and tourism. As a result, the disposable income of a majority of Thais has
been on the rise. A factor that has led to Thailand is the one of the worlds largest market for
illegal ivory (Stiles, 2009).
Myanmar and Laos
The two neighbors contain some of largest herds of Asian elephants and as a result, the
poaching menace is rapidly growing. The increasing role of the two countries may be attributed
to the growing pressure on their much bigger counterparts such as Vietnam and Thailand, to
organize efforts against the processing and trade of illegal ivory and rhino horn (Ponnuddurai,
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2012). Due to the illicit nature of the business, it’s hard to estimate the actual amount they bring
into the economies of the two nations.
However, the levels of poverty in the two countries is relatively high, and authorities may
be reluctant to crack down on the vice for fear of political backlash; it is particularly true
considering that the industry employees a significant number of people (Ponnuddhurai, 2012).
There is also minimal political will to fight the menace. A country such as Myanmar has
been embroiled in its own domestic conflict with the military Junta that had previously been in
power. This has created a nation more preoccupied with political survival rather than fighting
illegal ivory and rhino horn trading (Ponnuddhurai, 2012).
China
China is by far the largest market for ivory and rhino horn. The growth in demand for
these substances has been driven by the growing affluence of Chinese citizens, especially in the
middle-class category. China’s economy has grown at an average of 7% over the last two
decades lifting millions out of poverty (Trading Economics, 2017). The growth is attributed to its
manufacturing industry, leading to China being christened the factory of the world. The average
annual salary in the private sector has grown to reach $4755 (Trading economies, 2017). It is this
high spending power that is pushing China’s demand for ivory and rhino horn. China’s
communist government has also been complacent in the illegal trade until recently. This
complaisant attitude is a result of political patronage and corruption among officials.

Poachers & Traffickers
The individuals or groups that take part in the illegal wildlife trade, come from all walks
of life. They range from the basic opportunistic hunter to the multinational wildlife trafficker that
negotiates and bribes for illicit trading routes, depots and ports of entry that are the illegal
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pipeline that is needed to support the black market. The best way to investigate this aspect is to
divide them into six distinct groups. The groups consist of: 1.) Subsistence poachers, 2.) Market
Poachers, 3.) Crime Syndicates, 4.) Wildlife traffickers, 5.) Rebels, Militias and Terrorist groups
and 6.) Corrupt government officials or military (Duffy, 2010). They are written in order
according to the danger they pose to the rangers, public and wildlife communities, one being the
least and six being the most dangerous. When applicable, real world examples of the groups will
be given to illustrate severity and tangible evidence of the dangers they pose.
Subsistence poachers
The individuals that take part in the level of subsistence poaching are the least dangerous
of all the groups. Subsistence poachers are the people that make up the rural communities that
are far detached from the urban areas, which live off the natural resources in the local
environment. The term “bushmeat” is often used to describe the meat that is obtained from local
wildlife, a main source of protein in many rural communities diets. This form of subsistence
living has been used for thousands of years by humans and has only recently become a problem
with the other more nefarious groups exacerbation of wildlife resources in the wild (Duffy,
2010). These low level poachers normally target smaller animals, but have been known to take
down elephants, rhinoceros gorillas and other large wildlife as well. They also have substancehunting rights in the majority of countries, however they are often caught on private and
protected lands illegally hunting. Similarly, they have been reported to take down bigger game
more often because of the scarcity of local small game. This scarcity is caused by commercial
hunters and other criminal groups that sell small game in the bushmeat market or as food to
sustain themselves while poaching larger protected wildlife. The subsistence poacher is often the
local communal victim of wildlife enforcement and more often, lethal force. They are the ones
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that are caught in the grey zone or crossfire in the war to protect the biodiversity of the world.
The majority of them have grown up with a respectful coexistence with wildlife and only using
what they need and often leaving the tusks of elephants and rhino horns because they have no
use for them (Duffy, 2010). However, you will always have those who take advantage of a
monetary payday and step up to the next level of market poacher.
Commercial poachers
The Commercial poachers are the ground level group in the illegal wildlife market chain
that first pose direct danger to rangers and wildlife populations. These individuals are
commercial hunters that kill wildlife for the sole purpose of financial gain. They use animals to
sell in the bushmeat markets or other parts of the animals for the ornamental use to tourists in
local markets (Banks, 2006). They have also been known to capture live animals to sell to the
illegal pet trade for animal collectors and zoos. Market poachers often deploy harmful traps and
snares made from cheap and available resources. They normally deploy a number of cheap metal
snares that inhumanly catch wildlife, but have a high success rate. The traps also have the effect
of catching unintended wildlife and severely harming the animal. Similarly, traps are often
forgotten or discarded when poachers decided to end the hunt (Greenwood, 2015). This leads to
animals getting caught later on and dying a slow painful death. With nobody to retrieve the
animal, it decays and if near a water source can contaminate it for locals and wildlife. The career
poachers disturb local wildlife populations by over hunting, only to hurt local communities and
businesses. They take away the small game for the subsistence communities causing them to
have a lack of local small game which leads them to hunt illegally on protected land and hunt
bigger game because of the over hunting of small game for bushmeat market (van Vliet, 2012).
The local market for ecotourism business is hurt because the dwindling populations of wildlife
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and shrinking habitat cause a drop in tourism (Duffy, 2010; Barnett, 1998). The commercial
poachers are normally a minimal to moderate in lethal danger to rangers and law enforcement.
However, they have slowly become the majority of the first level of individuals involved with
criminal wildlife syndicates that have a criminal hierarchy that increased the number of lethal
occurrences between wildlife law enforcement and poachers.
Crime syndicates
The criminal syndicates are nothing new to human history with examples of prohibition
and illegal drugs, but what is new, is the employment of this organizational criminal hierarchy
when approaching the illicit wildlife trade market. Criminal syndicates are the group that has
dramatically increased the level of danger to wildlife and wildlife enforcement (Rademeyer,
2012). It can possibly be the reason for the global social acceptance for a more militarized
tactical approach when protecting and conserving wildlife. What is important to note about the
criminal syndicates is that it transcends & encompasses all the groups presented in this section of
poachers and traffickers. Meaning, any of the groups can fulfill a niche within the criminal
syndicate and more than one group is often presented within a criminal syndicate. To understand
this better, it is easiest to break the criminal syndicate organization down into levels, best
visually done in the documentary “ The Poachers Pipeline” produced by Al Jazeera’s
Investigative Unit. It is explained in five levels. The levels are as followed: 1.) Poachers, 2.)
Gang masters, 3.) Dealers, 4.) Importers, and 5.) Consumer. This was a great delineation in the
hierarchies of a criminal syndicate for poaching, only the first two level need further expansion
in this section due to the fact that levels three and four can be subsumed in the following group
of Wildlife traffickers and level five of consumer needs.
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The level one poachers make up the largest, most diverse and expendable level within the
criminal syndicates. They can be subsistence or commercial poachers, low-level gang members,
military, militia or rebels. The subsistence and commercial poachers are the groups that are often
victims of shoot-to-kill policies that cause the moral outrage and often the biggest pushback
against the use of military tactics when conserving and protect biological diversity (Duffy,
2015). The low level gang members, military, militia and rebels are the other side of this level
that create the most direct lethal affect to wildlife enforcement and local communities. They are
often financed, experienced and trained. With access to helicopters, high capacity ammunition
and other advanced military technologies, this level could be considered the most basic level of
divide in the use of military tactics in the conservation of biological diversity (Rademeyer,
2012). These low level members or foot soldiers controlled and instructed by the gang masters.
The gang masters are the individuals that organize and finance the kills. They can take on
many forms, from individuals that organize kills in the wild to rebel/ terrorist commanders and
even government officials. Only in the past couple yeas have a few countries cracked down on
this next level of poachers in the criminal syndicates (Rademeyer, 2012). The majority of
countries that have utilized a more militarized tactic and information sharing in conjunction with
resources provided by the International Policing Organization when dealing with poaching have
reported a capture or kill of these higher-level individuals involved in poaching criminal
syndicates (INTERPOL, 2013). This cooperation has led to some of the biggest arrests and
dismantling of wildlife trafficking criminal syndicates. In operation Infra Terra, led to the arrest
of Ben Simaski and associates, originally from Botswana but tracked down in Zambia in
possession of twelve cut pieces of Elephant tusk (INTERPOL, 2014). Another criminal
apprehended in operation Infra Terra was Nepal’s top wildlife criminal, Rajkumar Praja, who
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was suspected of killing nineteen rhinos in Chitwan National park and later caught by the Royal
Malaysian police in possession of a fraudulent passport (INTERPOL, 2015). Operation Infra
Terra along with numerous other successful operations with the cooperation of countries and
INTERPOL throughout Africa, India and Asia have lead to the capture of some of the worlds
most wanted wildlife criminals. Yet they all pale in comparison to the epitome of a Gang master
within a criminal syndicate, “Shetani” of Tanzania.
The focal point criminal of the Netflix documentary “ The Ivory Game”, forty-five year
old Boniface Matthew Mariango a.k.a. “Shetani”, the Swahili word for “Devil”, is credited with
involvement in poaching thousands of elephants within countries of Tanzania as well Kenya,
Zambia, and Mozambique (Elephant Action League, 2015). He was tracked and arrested by the
National and Transnational Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (NTSCIU) Task Force, all
captured in conjunction with an undercover documentary film crew. He was recently sentenced
to twelve years in prison, one of the first success stories of the new task force (BBC, 2017).
Wildlife traffickers
Wildlife traffickers are the individuals that create the lanes of illicit trade of poached
wildlife raw material or goods from one country to another. They normally work in the shadows
of the wildlife trade world and are most often the hardest to catch. They are known to have
involvement with crossover crimes, meaning they will not only be relegated to trafficking
wildlife goods but also guns, ammunition and even humans. The individuals that make up this
illegal wildlife trade market have created a 20 billion dollar international market (Nellemann,
2014). These individuals organized a vast array of corrupt individuals by not only by bringing
together crime syndicates but provide the market to militia groups, rebels, terrorist groups and
corrupt officials. Playing the middle man that interconnect the low level poacher providing for

27

family or the murderous group looking to financial support its cause to the foreign wholesaler
and consumer. The prime example of a wildlife trafficker is “ The Ivory Queen”, who was the go
between of “Shetani” foreign wholesalers (Elephant Action League, 2015).
In 2015, a Chinese a sixty-year-old businesswomen named Yang Feng Lan was arrested
in Tanzania for allegedly smuggling at least over 700 elephant tusks from East Africa to China
via here international connection. This amount of trafficking gave her the name “The Ivory
Queen”. Her and other Chinese national associates were arrested in Tanzania by NTSCIU and
face a maximum of thirty years behind bars in jail (Elephant Action League, 2015). This was the
first major blow to this criminal wildlife trafficking syndicated that eventually caught up with her
number one poacher “Shetani” approximately a year later.
Rebels, Militias and Terrorist groups
This group of rebels, militias and terrorist groups are the most direct lethal danger to
those on the frontlines of conservation and the anti-poaching movement. On the most basic level,
all of the groups involved here use the poaching and wildlife trade as a source of funding their
ideological and political agenda. Yet, a lot of the claims of certain groups like al- Shabaab, alQaeda and Boko Haram involvement have yet to be substantiated. However, one study states
that if they are involved, it is more on the trafficking side than the direct poaching of animals.
However, a few groups such as Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Janjaweed have been
documented with direct involvement in poaching elephants and illicit wildlife black market as a
source of financing their causes (Carlson, 2015).
Janjaweed
The Janjaweed have been on the international radar since the 1980’s. It is a militia that
operates out of western Sudan and eastern Chad. An international law official claims thousand of
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elephant deaths in Central Africa came at the hands of the Janjaweed. Recently, they have been
absorbed as a counter insurgency force of the Sudanese government. In 2007, the U.S.
government stated Janjaweed killed an estimated 200,000- 400,000 individuals in Darfur,
declaring it genocide (Trahan). Ugandan solders reported getting into a lethal conflict with a
Janjaweed ivory caravan of 400-armed men in 2010, where ten Ugandan solders lost their lives
(Gettleman, 2012). As recent as January 2012, hundreds of Janjaweed men were suspected of
slaughtering 300 elephants in Bouba Ndjada National Park, Cameroon (Saah, 2012).
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
The Lord’s Resistance Army or the LRA is a violent movement that began in Uganda in
the late1980’s. This group, led by the notorious Joseph Kony, is known for murder, mutilation,
rape and abduction of local communities. The majority of the abductions are children but has
been known to take adults too. Similarly, it has been estimated that they have abducted 70,000
children since 1987, using them for soldiers, porters and sex slaves. Since being pushed out of
Uganda, they made use of lose boarders and weak governments to find safe haven to rebuild. In
2005 they shifted operations to Garamba National park moving through CAR, South Sudan,
DRC and Sudan to evade capture while continuing to commit human rights crimes. In recent
years, reports of LRA soldier killing park rangers have increased, while defectors of the LRA
have claimed that Kony is funding his operations by poaching elephants (Anderson, 2014). In a
recent documentary called “Warlords of Ivory”, investigator journalist who implants a fake
elephant tusk with a GPS tracker, which the investigator gets the tusk into the LRA trade route
through an informant (Heminway, 2015). While, the tusk is tracking the route, he interviews
defectors that give testimony to the involvement in the ivory trade as a means to support LRA
agenda. The tusk takes a physically taxing route through dense jungle where it eventually ends in
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the Sudan territory of Darfur (Heminway, 2015). This coincides with recent reports in 2013 from
a Darfuri rebel group stating that the LRA and Kony’s current safe haven in Darfur has been
given cover by the Sudanese government (Ronan, 2013).
Corrupt government officials or military
The corrupt government officials and military are deemed the most dangerous of all the
groups because they operate in a realm of autonomy and immunity. There are two distinct types
of corrupt governmental officials, they can be foreign or domestic officials (Rademeyer, 2012).
The foreign government officials use diplomatic immunity to elude any prosecution of poaching
or trafficking crime. The domestic official and military take advantage by operating from within
the government entrusted to uphold wildlife policies in place (Nellemann, 2013). The
government officials may look the other way during transport, lobby for lower penalties for
poachers, or take part of a criminal syndicate and/or use military sources to directly poach
protected animals. Organized crime thrives where there is corruption. This can be identified as
the root cause in the proliferation in all the other groups of poachers previously mentioned which
have dramatically increased lethal conflicts between poachers and wildlife rangers.

Cost of being a Park Ranger
In the last decade, over a thousand park rangers have been killed in the line of duty, the
majority of them killed at the hands of commercial poachers. The global conservation effort now
has an additional worry along with the preservation of wildlife and forest areas. The safety and
security of park rangers is the new concern. Parks across Asia and Africa are destroyed out of
survival, greed and illegal activities. Park rangers are on the front line and face the ire of heavily
armed poachers, smugglers, and illegal loggers. Park rangers frequently face the threat of life and
battle the dangers of death on each day. Park rangers are the guardians of the natural resources
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and wildlife of our planet and the threats to their lives is unnerving and requires higher measures
from the respective governments of those countries. For the organizations that are working on
animal and wildlife conservation, their actions must start with preserving the lives of the humans,
i.e. the park rangers, who put their life on the line in protecting the wild reserves. In the last two
years, the murder of Rangers has reached 200, while in Africa alone, 27 Rangers died in the line
of duty in the past year, and poachers executed 80% of the killings. The data collected is based
on the reports submitted. It is assumed that the actual worldwide deaths of rangers related to
poaching could be 2 to 3 times higher. The most affected areas are those that are rich in
rosewood, sandalwood, elephants, and rhinos such as India, Kenya, and Congo. The president of
the International Ranger Federation (IRF) while acknowledging the threats of wildlife crimes has
also raised the concern for the safety of park rangers (Global Conservation, 2017).
Park Ranger Life Threats and Murder Rates in Africa and Asia
In the years of 2015, 60% of Rangers killed by poachers and militia were from Asia. The
majority of these rangers were from India, Thailand, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and
Kenya. Sean Willmore, the president of the IRF worldwide, stated that two rangers are killed
every week, which according to him is a conservative number, noting that the actual figure could
be more (Neme, 2014). Figure (8) depicts the ranger deaths as captured by IRF from by the
method of self-reporting in the period of 2009-2016 with the highest reported number in Asia.
The second highest number is found in Africa.
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Figure (8): Reported Ranger Deaths in the period of 2009-2016 (IRF - World Ranger Day, 2016)
Ranger murders in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, Kenya, and Uganda
In the years of 2015-2016, more than 14 rangers have been killed in the Congo’s
Garamba National Park during anti-poaching missions. Garamba is a UNESCO heritage site, and
the poachers are believed to come from South Sudan and Uganda. The situation at Gabon has
been equally as dangerous, and the wildlife crimes increased to such levels that the president of
Gabon shared the plight of rangers at the hands of poachers (Armed Poachers Killing Rangers
Who Defend Elephants In Congo Park, 2016). In 2008, 12 wildlife rangers were gunned down in
the Virunga National Park. The ordeals and risks faced by wildlife rangers in this region of the
Congo are equivalent to combat soldiers as the rangers routinely face death, and torture from
poachers. Since 2004, more than 150 rangers have been killed in Virunga alone. Kenya has been
confronted with a similar battle with poachers. The Kenyan government officials and influential
politicians have been accused of collaborating with the poachers. Kenya has seen a noticeable
jump in the number of killings of park rangers in recent years (Neme, 2014). The IRF mentions
three deaths of rangers in Kenya caused by poaching incidents in the period of 2015-2016. In the
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year of 2014, there were ten reported ranger killings in Kenya (Gemawat, 2014). In the period of
2002-2012, there have been roughly 25 deaths of park rangers in Uganda that are attributed to
poachers. In the past decade, Uganda has lost rangers due to shots by poachers and encroachers,
and falling in poacher traps, apart from accidental and natural causes (Our Wild Life Heroes,
2013).
Ranger murders in South Africa
Poaching has resulted in converting ecological rarities like Kruger National Park in South
Africa into a virtual war zone. The Rhinos and Elephants in South Africa have been resource of
accelerated poaching and wildlife crimes. The park rangers have been trained in military tactics
and combat. In 2016, there had been three reported deaths of rangers in South Africa during a
shootout with poachers. South African conservation groups frequently train their Rangers in
armed combats and military tactics (Funk, 2016).
Central African Republic, Tanzania, Mozambique, Sudan and South Sudan
The situation in the Central African Republic (CAR), Tanzania, Sudan, and South Sudan
regions has been the same; wars are raging in these areas. The rangers killed in these regions face
war-like and war-crime situations. The battle in the CAR region has slowly exploded as armed
militia have taken to poaching and engage park rangers in armed combat, seriously injuring
several rangers that lead to deaths. In Tanzania, poachers killed a British pilot. Five rangers were
shot dead in Garamba who were working for the South African based Non-profit group. These
rangers were giving military and armed combat training to other Rangers in CAR, Sudan, Kenya,
Uganda, Chad, Somalia, and Tanzania. Sudan and South Sudan regions are said to be the starting
points of serious poaching, where militant groups started funding their organizations through
wildlife killings. The risk of park rangers has increased as the black market for ivory and Rhino
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has grown with the cost of both of these items going above that of gold and platinum. It has been
observed that the regions of DRC, CAR, Sudan, Mozambique, and Tanzania have weak
governments, which lack support for rangers. This contributes to increasing poaching activities
and aggravates the threat to wildlife ranger’s lives. Rangers are killed in these areas on a regular
basis. Even Mozambique poachers have now ventured into organized crime that can be
characterized as consolidated and militarized efforts (Vidal, 2016).
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Figure 9: 2015-2016 Ranger Roll of Honor (IRF - World Ranger Day, 2016)
Figure (9), depicts the number of ranger deaths due to poaching incidents in the period of
2015-2016, as visible, the highest number of murders have been in the regions of DRC and India,
following by Uganda, Gabon, and Kenya. The data has been extracted from the Roll of Honor
documents published by IRF for worldwide park ranger deaths and classifying each death as an
accident, natural or homicide. All the death numbers represented here are homicides, as
classified by IRF based on reported data.
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Ranger murders in India and Nepal
Forest rangers in India have the highest mortality rates in Asia, far greater than Africa
sometimes. The period of 2011-2014 saw 72 deaths of park rangers by poachers. IRF report puts
the Ranger killings highest in India, which accounts for 60% of global ranger murders by
poachers. In 2013, the ranger deaths in India were 14, which was a large number as compared to
even some of the most troubled areas of Chad, and Congo where the ranger deaths were less than
10. In the year of 2014, the ranger killings in India were 24, which was much high as compared
to that of Kenya (Gemawat, 2014). Nepal had growing Rhino population and had been struggling
with the poaching menace for an extended period. However, through the support of the local
community and park rangers, the country has been able to save its Rhino population with one
reported ranger murder in the past two years (Ortolani, 2016). As depicted in Figure (9), India
had the largest number of deaths in past two years at 17, while Nepal had the lowest at 1.
Ranger murders in Zambia
In the most recent events of the killings of park rangers, the latest news came to light in
Zambia, where poachers gunned down a park ranger. The incident has left the ranger community
in shock as the toll of slain park rangers has been mounting and illegal wildlife trade continues.
The events have led some parks to initiate controversial policies such as the, “shoot at sight
policy” found in the Kaziranga Park in India (Hance, 2017).
Ranger Murders in Angola, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe
Poaching activities are common in the region of Angola. This has led to significant
threats and challenges for the park rangers. The number of reported deaths of rangers related to
poaching in these areas has been very low, as compared to other regions. Botswana, Namibia,
and Zimbabwe have the most vulnerable areas for wildlife, as it is also those areas where trophy
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hunting is legalized. The rangers here have salaries as low as $125 per month, for which they put
their lives on the line. The worldwide average murder rate of Rangers, including all the areas of
Asia and Africa, has been estimated to be 1 KIA (killed-in-action) for every four days (Why We
Serve, 2015).
Thereby, it is revealed through various reports and studies that the rate of park ranger’s murder is
that every fourth day one ranger is murdered across all the parks and natural reserves due to
poaching, wild crimes or other related activities. Some studies keep the figure at two murders per
week, although both estimates are conservative. Based on reported data, the actual numbers
could be much higher.

Law & Enforcement
A majority of the countries around the world are members of the Convention of
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITIES), a treaty which
states that members “are obligated to monitor the global wildlife trade and wildlife products and
take action on behalf of species that may be heading for trouble”(Hemley, 1994). CITES is
funded by the member countries, those who are not as economically wealthy provide as little as
300 USD and those who are the wealthiest are expected to provide 1 million USD. The United
States is the primary contributor, giving 25 percent of the annual funding to CITES (Hemley,
1994). CITIES provides a global intelligence apparatus on wildlife trade, however it lacks the
ability to enforce and penalize wildlife criminals. By CITIES own admission, “success depends
on the national and political will of each party…and must establish fines and other penalties as
appropriate” (Hemley, 1994). This alone is the biggest criticism for CITIES utility but it is an
invaluable tool of intelligence for wildlife conservation.
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Ivory Ban
From 1979 to 1989 the number of African elephants plummeted from approximately 1.2
to about 600,00 causing the members of CITES to enact the Ivory ban. This effectively banned
the international commercial trade of African elephant ivory by placing the species on Appendix
I, which is the reserved for the most protected and critically endangered of extinction (Hemley,
1994). The ivory ban commenced with Kenya burning its ivory stockpile as a symbolic sign of
new era of protection on the African elephant population. The ban initially worked, poaching
slowed down dramatically in the following decade. Two of the world’s biggest consumers of
elephant ivory at that time were China and the United States. Demand within the United States
dropped to a historic low, while ivory carving factories and shops closed down in China. Both
seen the ivory markets within each country all but disappear (Humane Society International,
2016). The banned seemed to be a success and the elephant population began to rebound but the
victory was short lived.
In 1997 CITES allowed what they called a “one off sale” of 40 tons of ivory from
Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to Japan. In 1999 the sale took place and poaching began to
soar again. Again in 2002 CITES allowed another “one off sale” of 60 tons of ivory from
Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Increased to 102 tons when the final sale to
Japan and China took place in 2008 (Humane Society International, 2016). These “one off
sales” were allowed by CITES under the condition funds must be “used exclusively for elephant
conservation and community conservation and development programs within or adjacent to the
elephant range” (Cruise, 2016). These “one of sale” recreated the ivory market in the Asian
market but the legal ivory available was far from being able to satisfy the demand. At every
CITES meeting, southern African nations lobby to sell Ivory. In 2008 the southern African
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nations managed to convinced International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to
downgrade the official status of elephants from Appendix I (endangered) to Appendix II
(vulnerable) (Cruise, 2016). The IUCN contributes to CITES by using data analyses to submit
proposals in order to amend CITES Appendices (IUCN, 2017). In 2016 Kenya and Southern
African Development Community (SADC) agreed to hold talks to find a common position on the
Ivory trade (Cruise, 2016). The SADC consist of member countries such as Angola, Botswana,
DRC, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
(SADC, 2017). The majority of SADC favors ivory trade, most vocally lead by South Africa and
Zimbabwe who want trade without CITES restrictions. While Kenya apposed all ivory trade and
would prefer a total ban on it, shown once again by its symbolic burning of confiscated ivory
stockpile of 105 tons in 2016 (Cruise, 2016).
Rhino Horn Ban
In 1977, CITES ban the international trade of rhino horn because of the concern over the
extinction of the species around the world (Hemley, 1994). Like with the ivory ban in 1989, the
rhino horn ban of 1977 seen success over the next two decades. In 1994, CITES downgraded
white rhino from South Africa from Appendix I to Appendix II, allowing export trophy horn
taken in legal non-commercial hunts. Yet, this could be due to the success seen in population
growth or the fact that South African lobbyist within CITES persuaded the council to downgrade
them, much like they did with the ivory ban in 2008. Nevertheless the downgrade created a legal
loophole that began to be used right away by criminals but was not realized until 2003 when
Asian nationals began obtaining licenses to export trophy horn and selling them on the black
market (Bale, 2015). This loophole quickly proliferated and reenergized the dwindling market
much like the “one off sales” did for the ivory ban. In 2009, South Africa made the decision to
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ban the domestic trade of rhinoceros horn. In 2012 a game farmer named John Kruger sued the
government of South Africa to lift its ban on the domestic trade of rhino horn, later joined by
another farmer John Hume in 2015, creating a class action suit against the South African
government (Christy, 2015). In 2017, the South African highest court rejected the government’s
bid to keep a ban on the domestic trade of rhino horn (Bale, 2017). Leading many to believe that
this will intensify the poaching crisis once again.
Present Day
Wildlife law for poaching and trafficking across Africa, Asia and other places around the
world vary greatly with regards to penalties. The majority of the countries plagued by poaching
and trafficking have laws and penalties in place but garner a lot of criticism from wildlife
advocate groups, rooted in the fact that penalties are non-existent or lightly punished. This has
caused the proliferation of wildlife crimes in certain areas more than others. Certain countries are
havens for individuals that would cross the borders and invade the national sovereignty of a
neighboring county to poach animals, only to escape safely back across the border (Obank,
2015). One example would be poachers from Mozambique crossing into South Africa and killing
rhinos in Kruger or LRA poachers in central Africa taking advantage of the nearby borders and
the lack of trans border security, allowing them to evade authorizes while pillaging elephant
populations (Carlson, 2015). Gabon’s penalties are considered minimal in sentencing a
maximum of three to six months’ imprisonment (Fletcher, 2014). Penalties like this have
minimal effect on dissuading poachers from the incentive posed by the payday of poaching.
Similarly, in the past, South African that has some of the strictest penalties had judges and
prosecutions that would tend to give the minimum penalty to those convicted of poaching
wildlife (Obank, 2015). In last four years, the countries of Botswana, Kenya, Mozambique,
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Zambia and South Africa have implemented new or amended old laws in in order to strengthen
penalties. The absence of penalties in countries affected by wildlife poaching has been the major
factor in the increased numbers of animal and ranger deaths across Africa and Asia. In the
appendix of this paper, you will find three tables detailing the penalties of Southern and Eastern
Africa (appendix 1), Central Africa (appendix 2) and Asia (appendix 3).
U.S. & China
In 2015, the United States and China came to agreement to ban the trade and sale of ivory
within each countries respective borders. This was a monumental announcement because of
China being the world’s largest consumer of ivory. In 2016, an executive order by President
Obama, the United States fulfilled its end of the agreement by adopting a near-total ivory ban.
This order restricts ivory sale and export across state lines. The only way to trade ivory within
the United States now is to prove that it is considered an “ivory relic”, meaning that it is over one
hundred years old or a small part of an manufactured item (i.e. ivory handle gun). This also
limits ivory imports to two per hunter per year, this was previously unlimited (Actman, 2016).
As recent as 2007 China has insisted that ivory carving is an “ intangible cultural
heritage” to the country (Mathiesen, 2017). This all changed with the bipartisan agreement with
the United States in 2015. By March of 2017 China had closed half of all licensed carvers and
retailers with the commitment to close the remaining by the end of the year. This is a major step,
considering 90% of all ivory sold in China is illegal (Mathiesen, 2017). Yet, they also leave the “
ivory relic” loophole like the United States. These loopholes will need time to see if they create a
gray area for illicit trade and criminals to lander black market ivory through. However, early
reports state that the price of ivory has dropped 50% across Asia since the announcement of the
ban in 2015 (Larsson, 2017).
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Enforcement
With the evolving and increasing threat to wildlife, the type of enforcement surrounding
the protection of wildlife has also evolved. A vast amount of contention has been created
between activists, researchers and the global community as a whole. One major issue involves
identifying the appropriate amount of enforcement need, keeping in mind, with the goal to
protect and preserve wildlife, while respecting the human rights in the surrounding areas. In the
recent years, wildlife rangers and enforcement officials have undergone a militarization of
conservation (Lunstrum, 2014). This has caused much anxiety and fear in the environmental
community because of the use of the word “militarization”. Though, some have gravitated to
using the word “securitization” instead of “militarization” (Barnett, 1998). This is not
unwarranted, especially considering the some of the countries histories with war and other social
injustices.
The use of militarization has been implemented on all levels of enforcement in antipoaching efforts. Military grade equipment pertains to technologies that contain (1) better parts
to withstand environmental conditions, (2) maintain higher vibrations or accelerations, (3)
greater ranges, air time or battery life, (4) hardened defenses (EMP, Nuclear or Projectile), (5)
harder to decrypt or hack (Cress, 2014). Both militarization and military grade equipment are at
the forefront of discussions as solutions to end the illegal poaching of animals. The reason why
this distinction is made is due to the fact that most conservationists don’t have the problem with
adopting military technologies when it comes to drones and radio collars as a tool for research.
However, when it comes to tactics and the deployment of forces to enforce wildlife policy and
conservation, there is considerable pushback that will be addressed later.
The idea of militarized conservation efforts has become an integral part of the defenses in
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many areas of the world. Most, if not all, preserves of protected lands employ ex-law
enforcement or those with military backgrounds to protect and uphold the policies of the
government or landowner (Lunstrum, 2014)). One specific example of this is SAN Parks of
South Africa. There, they have hired a retired Army Major, who held a security and antipoaching campaign that immediately increased surveillance. They implemented the use of
drones, via partnerships with military firms (Lunstrum, 2014). Another example is the hiring of
ex Special Forces members to train rangers in Virunga National Park (Neme, 2014; Marijnen,
2016). In hiring military educated minds and consulting with those involved with conservation
efforts, more sophisticated military technologies are being introduced in the field.
The use of such militarized tactics and enforcement has lead to more lethal interactions
with poachers, where both the rangers and poachers have died. It has also created an increase in
military technology by employing helicopters, advanced weaponry, drones, night vision and
other technology to gain an advantage over the opposing side. This more militarized approach
has seen some success in deterring and stopping wildlife crimes (Nuwer, 2017). In Tanzania, the
anti-poaching task force is credited with capturing two of the most notorious criminals, “Shetani”
and “the Ivory Queen” (Elephant Action League, 2015). Zakoumu National Park in Chad has
seen recent success since training and implementing a more militarized approach for the
conservation and protection its’ elephants in the park (Nuwer, 2017). Despite recent successes,
you still have those who condemn the militarization of conservation, marginalizing its
advantages and often conflating the militarization with “shoot to kill” policies (STK) employed
by some countries.
Shoot to Kill Policy
The shoot to kill policy is the most controversial policy that has ever been implemented
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in the name of conservation. The STK policy that gives Rangers and security forces the right to
shoot suspected poachers on sight (Duffy, 2010). A variety of interrelated factors have led to the
creation of the shoot to kill policy. The first issue involves a weak judicial system, which has
been plagued by corruption, low conviction rates, and inadequate evidence. The transnational
and reoccurring offenses of individuals have cause countries to implement shoot to kill policies.
Second, the increased lethal interaction between rangers and poachers has resulted in the loss of
rangers’ lives, normally leaving behind wife and children. Thirdly, it provides immunity for
rangers to act without fear of legal repercussion (Duffy, 2010). Finally, the use of shoot to kill
has seen some positive results in respects to protecting threatened wildlife (Messer, 2010;
Chenteni, 2014; Carlson, 2015; Mogomotsi, 2017). However, it has been linked in some cases of
corruption and human rights violations (Duffy, 2010).
A number have countries have such as Tanzania, Botswana, Zimbabwe, India Kenya and
Swaziland had or have implemented shoot to kill policies. When Zimbabwe first introduced the
shoot to kill policy it had an immediate effect, but quickly gained criticism. This criticism spilled
over to the WWF that donated a helicopter that that was used in a shoot to kill operation, causing
WWF to pull funding in fuel for helicopter (Duffy, 2010). Yet, in the short time of its
implementation, Zimbabwe elephant population increased from 52,000 to 72,000 (Mogomotsi,
2017). In Tanzania, the STK policy was very effective, however it was short lived, due to links
in arbitrary murder, rape and the torture of innocent people. After the policy was dropped,
elephant poaches increased again (Smith, 2013). Kenya recently implemented a shoot to kill
policy and it has seen a drop in the number of elephants poached but some people blamed the
shoot to kill for accelerating the poacher’s tactics, evasiveness and willingness to use lethal force
(Carlson, 2015). Botswana has carried out the STK policy for some time, as the government of
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Botswana considers the act of poaching an act of war and “ as such targeted killings or ‘shoot-tokill’ policies are legal” under international humanitarian law (Mogomotsi, 2017) In the last two
decades, they have killed 30 Namibians and 22 Zimbabweans. Most of these occurred on the
border and were claimed to be fishermen, not poachers. Botswana has no wildlife population
numbers to compare its success of the STK policy (Konopo, 2016). However, South Africa and
Botswana have recently agreed to transfer 500 rhino from South Africa to a non-STK country
such as Botswana (Stoddard, 2014; Howard, 2015) . In Kaziranga National Park in India, 50
poachers have been killed from 2014 to 2017. There has been a “zero tolerance” policy in
Kaziranga where officials are ordered to kill poachers or anyone in the park at night. This is an
important distinction because the majority of poachers killed since 2014 have been at night
(Kashyap, 2017). This has led groups to criticize the WWF for funding and supplying antipoaching efforts with technologies like night vision goggles. Kaziranga rangers receive cash
bonuses for killing poachers, which is very troubling. Defended by M.K. Yadava, the park
director, who stated, “heavily armed poaching gangs regularly engage guards” (Rowlatt, 2017).
Swaziland, the landlocked monarchy within South Africa, has one of the most successful
conservation and anti-poaching campaigns. Its rhino protection is unmatched by any other
country according to International Union for Conservation of Nature. Led by Ted Reilly, the
head of Big Game Parks says, “ Our anti-poaching legislation in Swaziland is preventative
legislation – not remedial legislation. We prefer not to put people in jail and we want to keep our
rhinos alive. People say our law is draconian, but it’s worked” (Ramsey, 2014). Showing that
they know it is harsh and excessive, however it has provided the desired results without
burdening the economy by filling jail cells. The STK policy has severe human rights violations
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issues and in some cases, despite this, it is hard to dismiss the reports of the effectiveness antipoaching efforts.
Militarization Conservation Critics
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is in direct opposition to
the practice of militarization of protecting and conserving the biological diversity of an
environment. (Duffy, 2010) CBNRM places a large emphasis on educating and informing the
local community on the benefits associated with protecting and saving the local wildlife. To
those who advocate for he practice of CBNRM, the greatest indicator of environmental
destruction is the presence of local and global military groups (Khagram, 2006). One of the
biggest purveyors of this ideal is Elizabeth Lunstrum, who actually coined the phrase of “Green
Militarization” (2014). She stated that militarization of a conservation effort actually only
succeeds in the dehumanization of the rhino poacher and alienating the community. Lunstrum
noted that this prevailed when fortress conservation overtook community conservation in the
1900s (2014). Arguing that militarization of conservation as a racial war of injustice saying “to
protect areas as space of belonging for whites only” and “these calls are indeed radicalized even
if signs of racism have been erased and regardless of intent”, trying to create the image of the
poacher as a victim by calling them the “poor foot soldiers of opportunistic criminal syndicates”
(Lunstrum, 2015). Esther Marijnen further exacerbated the sentiment of white privilege by
depicting those protecting wildlife as “heroic (white) military trainers and park guards as
martyrs” (Marijnen, 2016). Dr.Marijnen explains that the need to protect wildlife explanations
often have “Neomalthusian or Neobarbarian undertones, thereby accomplishing the
criminalization and othering of rebels and poachers” (2016). Thus creating a growing
convergence of biodiversity conservation and capitalism by allowing the securitization and
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following racially motived economic injustice that had been prevalent in the area. (Marijen 2016)
The obvious shortfalls to Marijnen’s militarized conservation efforts include the underlying
socialistic and communistic agenda as well as discounting the ideal of national sovereignty. She
considers the securitization and boundary drawing as a type of radicalized colonial trope,
ultimately dismissing the thought of national sovereignty.
A more moderate opponent of militarized conservation is Rosaleen Duffy, who refuted
the use of strong and forceful approaches to conservation for the lack of evidence that they can
work, believing the ranger/ poacher conflict only added to alienating the local communities
(Duffy, 2015). Thinking it will required a commitment over decades from all stakeholders with
community outreach solutions and not just greater enforcement in wildlife rich countries (Duffy,
2010). Yet, she neglects the fact that estimates of elephants and rhinoceroses do not have
decades for community outreach programs to sink in before the species go extinct if current
poaching numbers persist. According to Dr. Dame Daphne Sheldrick, an elephant is killed every
15 minutes in Africa and could be extinct in as little as 12 years time (2015). Although, Rosaleen
Duffy does concede that there is no one size fits all strategy and points out that “clearly different
trades might require very different policy responses according to species, place of origin, trade,
transit route and profile demand” (2015). Yet, perhaps all of the critics of militarization of
conservation concerns were best summed up by Jennifer Bond when she said “the term “ wildlife
security” betrays the underlying perception that wildlife is the referent object to be secured, not
the human, and that force is a legitimate method for preserving this security” (2017).

Discussion
The populations of elephants, rhinoceros and many other animals not discussed in
this paper are being decimated across the world by human interaction. The African elephant
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population has decreased by 91.7 %, from a plentiful population numbered in the millions in the
early 20th century, to a mere few hundred thousand present day (Allen, 2014). Asian elephants
have likewise had a dramatic decrease in population by 50% since early 1900’s, with only
30,000 of the remaining 50,000 living in the wild. The world’s rhinoceros population is in a
much dire situation, with the five remaining sub species only totaling an estimated population
number of 29,201. In addition, two of those subspecies have a population number of 100 or less
(Emslie, 2012; Acharya, 2012; van Strien, 2008). If current trends continue for the elephants and
rhinoceros populations, both will be extinct in the matter of decades. Areas that need more
research to combat this are population carrying capacities, which included minimal population
size with recognizing the importance of genetic diversity and social structure. These studies will
help to prevent and avoid genetic bottlenecking, that was discovered in one such study conducted
in Cat Tien National Park in Vietnam (Vidya, 2007). Genetic bottlenecking can be very
detrimental to wildlife populations, it is when there is a lack in genetic diversity within a
population (Venturas, 2013). This lack of genetic diversity can have negative consequences due
to inbreeding:
“ Inbreeding may lead to the buildup of deleterious recessive genes, termed inbreeding
depression, that may cause decreased fecundity, increased mortality, slowed growth,
developmental defects, increased susceptibility to disease, decreased ability to withstand stress,
and decreased ability to compete” (Larson, 2012).
This coincides with the fact that the loss of any biological diversity is a loss in an
important part of the “genetic library available for scientific research, which in turn precludes
potential discoveries of life-saving drugs, new agricultural crops, and antidotes for human-
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induced ecological changes” (Dabelko, 1997). Moreover, the loss of any one species threatens
the survival of the remaining flora and fauna in any ecosystem (Bragdon, 1992).
The loss of any biological diversity will gradually erode the natural capital base of any
economy (Barnett, 1998). The vast majority of countries of Africa and Asia affected by the
shrinking populations of elephants and rhinoceros have a significant portion of their economies
dependent on ecotourism from international visitors. Tourist visit in order to see wild animals
that can only be seen within these countries, while they are there, they sleep in the hotels, eat at
the restaurants, buy souvenirs from local vendors and donate to conservation efforts. If they go
extinct, a significant portion of these countries economies will disappear with them. This would
be devastating to a number of these countries that are either enveloped by poverty or teetering on
the brink of it.
The local governments and politicians of these affected areas have struggled to deal with
the threat of loss in biological diversity, especially when it comes to poaching of elephants,
rhinoceros, and other wildlife within their countries borders. Almost all lack the financial ability,
resources and strategy to combat the poaching epidemic that is widespread across Africa and
Asia. Furthermore, there are corrupt government officials and military that fund or support
illegal poaching, creating an ongoing political conflict behind the veil of governmental immunity
(Cardamone, T, 2012). That allows poachers to operate within certain countries with autonomy
or act like a haven for particular poachers or syndicates after they illegally killed wildlife in
neighboring nations.
As previously discussed poachers and traffickers come from all walks of life and vastly
different degrees of sophistication and funding. One fact remains that they all get involved with
the poaching of elephant ivory and rhino horn because of the lucrative monetary gains they can
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achieve from participating in this illegal practice combined with the economic situations present
in many African and Asian regions affected by poaching. Giving credence to Upton Sinclair’s
adage that “it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon
him not understanding it” (Waldau, 2011).
Capturing poachers has shown to be not enough to solve recurring poaching issues in
critical areas because of the weak implementation of laws and disparity in sentencing in different
regions. In South Africa, almost 700 suspected rhino poachers and traffickers were arrested in
2016, but not all of the guilty were sentenced to prison. Laws that exist in many countries
concerning wildlife crimes are not the same. Many countries do not punish criminals with long
years of imprisonment for wildlife crimes (Cardamone, 2012).
Depending on the situation, the length of prison sentences differs. In other scenarios
where the illegal hunter is captured before attacking a rhino or an elephant, the charges given by
prosecutors are most likely for less serious crimes, such as illegal possession of firearms and
trespassing with weapons. It will require evidence, such as a dead rhino or elephant at the scene
for poachers caught in the act to be sentenced appropriately. In other words, wildlife still needs
to shed blood to be favored by law (WWF, 2014). There are strict laws imposed against these
perpetrators, in particular, but even if the evidence is strong, poachers are still acquitted after trial
or granted bail and abscond. Furthermore, penalties for rhino and elephant poaching in some
regions, such as Kenya, include fines that do not compensate the cost of damage done to nature’s
biodiversity. Thus, there is major frustration in making these wildlife offenders pay for their
crimes (WWF, 2014). It is safe to say that the implementation of the law and the traditional
measures to eradicate poaching are unfortunately not working, considering the dwindling
population of rhinos and elephants, as well as big cats in critical areas. Even the Ivory Ban and
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the Rhino Horn Ban, which are the classic laws that are meant to protect these giants, are not
respected by poachers. In addition to particular governments lobbying for one off sales every
chance they get. In other words, they no longer work efficiently and sustainably because those
poachers who get away with fines, bailed out, or have been acquitted wrongly tend to go back to
the national parks and kill more animals because basically, this is the only way they know how
they can make a lot of money (WWF, 2014).
The low-level subsistence poachers and commercial poachers who have a minimal threat
to Park Rangers that could be dealt with in a less forceful manner but you also have the criminal
syndicates, militant and terrorist groups that pose a deadly threat to Park Rangers and law
enforcement. These terrorist groups and militants that poach ivory and rhino horns to fund their
organization, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army and Janjaweed (under the leadership of Al
Shabaab and Darfur) are two of the most infamous militant groups in Africa. They have been
documented being involved in the black market trade of wildlife resources for financial gain.
They use their profits from illegal trades to buy their weapons. These arms are also used to
advance their political or ideological beliefs and in addition to killing park rangers who lack the
advanced weapons and skills to fight back. The militias are armed with "automatic weapons,
GPS systems and the best transport” since they are well funded by their illegal business (WWF,
2014). As stated earlier in this paper, over 200 rangers have been killed in the last two years by
poachers (IRF). This vast degree in the difference in poachers provides a challenging task for law
enforcement to distinguish ‘which is which’ when you’re out in the bush, Rangers never know if
the individuals they are dealing with are ready to use deadly force.
This threat has forced the hand of many countries to adopt a more militarized approach to
conservation. Not only to stop increased poaching numbers of the past several years but to
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protect the Rangers by supplying them with the training and equipment necessary to effectively
combat the new breed of lethal poacher. Though this new strategy of militarized conservation
employed by countries lacked the adequate trainers and finances for proper equipment to combat
the funding the poachers, syndicates, terrorists and militants receive. Western nations and
charitable organizations have made efforts to donate resources to aid African nations who need
help to combat poaching. The U.S. and other western European countries have given military
trainers and equipment. Organizations like WWF has donated a helicopter and night vision
capabilities (Duffy, 2010) Though this has been met with much criticism by some who feel it is
new form of western imperialism and a return to a colonial type of control of these poaching
plagued nations (Marijnen, 2016). Causing the world of the west to step back some of the
desperately needed resources to those countries fighting this wildlife war.
To, combat this lack of resources some countries need to use an iron fist, to eliminate
personal and political interests and protect wildlife before it is too late. Countries such as
Botswana now consider poaching and act of war (Mogomotsi, 2017). Enacting a shoot to kill
policy that had been adopted in the past by some countries with great success. Such as in
Zimbabwe in the late 80’s that saw poaching drop dramatically and elephant population grow
from 52,000 to 72,000 (Mogomotsi, 2017). Although the shoot to kill policy became very
controversial, strongly condemned by human rights activists and conservative organizations, it
proved to be effective even in such a short span of time. The STK policy saw 53% drop in
elephant poaching and 10.3% drop in rhino poaching. When the policy was lifted due to protests,
the number of wildlife deaths by poaching rose back to an alarming scale (WWF, 2014). This
only means that the bad guys are back in business.
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It is entirely understood why the shoot to kill policy was strongly opposed, because of the
ethical issues. Although those that oppose both the militarization of conservation and shoot to
kill policies have no viable answer to stop this new breed of poachers. They point to communitybased natural resource management and legislative solutions. Community-based natural resource
management has been pushed out to the local communities for more than 50 years to no avail.
Even the legislative avenue has proven to fail with either weak penalties or unwillingness to
enforce the laws by government officials. The threatened wildlife such as elephants and
rhinoceroses do not have the population numbers or luxury to wait for a strategy of strategic
patience to take hold. To adapt quote from the former A.G. of Massachusetts Scott Harchbarger
once said about campaign financing to militarized conservation and shoot to kill policies, “this is
not the utopian comprehensive solution to poaching and conservation, but this is a tourniquet
proven to stop the bleeding.”
This is not meant to say that militarization of conservation is the entire solution to
ending the poaching and trafficking of wildlife around the world but a vital part of the solution.
The community-based natural resource management is also an important component of the
solution. There is no one size fits all strategy, “clearly different trades might require different
policy responses according to species, place of origin, trade transit routes and profile of demand”
(Duffy, 2015). For that reason it is imperative for advocates of both strategies must stop talking
past one another and start working with one another for a holistic, innovative and integrative
solution to combined two different public priories of military defense and sustainable
development (Barnett, 1998).
New research needs to be done that combines both aspects like Nikkita Guvant Patel
recent paper that identified the key countries that would fragment the illegal trade network

52

through law enforcement and the countries nodes for optimal information dissemination (2015).
Showing that by focusing on the top six countries of each, would likely decrease illegal wildlife
trade network up to 90% and allow wild populations to recover. Another recent innovative
solution proposed is by Pembient, a biotech firm based in San Francisco. They offer the solution
of 3D printing synthetic rhino horn that is the same genetic fingerprint as the real horn at a
fraction of the price. They would then flood the illegal black market with the synthetic and
undistinguishable horn from the real thing. In turn driving down the price and crash the market
for rhino horn. Make economically unreasonable and not worth the risk for poaching the real
thing (Unnikrishnan, 2015). However, critics such as International Rhino Foundation ‘s
executive director Susie Ellis believe this would create the sense that the consumption of rhino
horn is acceptable and be counterproductive to informational dissemination campaigns in Asia
(Unnikrishnan, 2015). Despite criticism, this illustrates new fresh ideas outside a militarized or
community-based solution might be viable options to aid in the effort.
More importantly, the two factions need to come to an understanding of the ideas of
national sovereignty and the philosophical idea of extensionism. The concept of national
sovereignty is the cornerstone of international law and wildlife threats are seldom confined to the
territory of one state and often transcend national borders (Gardner, 2011). One state may not
dictate to another how to regulate its activities, but the “ loss of worlds’ genetic resource
exemplifies an environmental problem without boundaries- a problem that requires a global
solution, but that directly affects national plans and priorities” (Bragdon, 1992). The challenge
for the world is to rethink how to approach extinction of wildlife within the confines of a system
that rest upon national sovereignty (Gardner, 2011). Conditional assistance has been proven to be
successful in other areas such as pollution and could be adapted to wildlife conservation. A
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United Nations adoption of the Pittman-Robertson Act of 1937 in the United States could
become a foundation for it which provides financial assistance to states for “the selection,
restoration, rehabilitation and improvement” of wildlife habitat (Freyfogle, 2009). These
provided resources and support should not be condemned by those who espouse solely for
community outreach as a form of the western world trying to reassert its power over developing
countries, as a hope to return to a post colonial control over the minorities. Those who do, fail to
realize what the real minority in the situation is and fails to understand the philosophical belief of
extensionism.
The theory of extensionism is the extension of the philosophical concepts and beliefs
historically reserved for men and more recently humans (Hadley, 2016). As an example, history
has shown the possibility how the social construct of rights has been extended to those of
different, race, sex and disability (Schaffner, 2011). It is only the next logical step to extend
those rights to species outside of our own. Creating a global belief in “biocentrism” that gives all
living things intrinsic value by simply being alive (Hadley, 2016). If this view is adopted by all,
it will realign the thoughts of what the actual minority in the situation is, making the threaten
wildlife the referent and not the socially constructed races of those illegally killing them.

Conclusion
As expressed throughout this paper, the world is facing biological diversity extinction
threat. If the acceptance of new working strategies are not implemented, a vast amount of the
world's wildlife will disappear. Two of the direst cases the world faces are that of the elephant
and rhinoceros population. Those who have advocated for community-based natural resource
management have condemned the use of militarized conservation, yet they have had been unable
to stop the acceleration of the two species from disappearing throughout Africa and Asia. By
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condemning the use of militarized conservation to combat poachers, criminal syndicates, militias
and terrorist groups, they are “vindicating the rights of brutes”. Proponents of militarization of
conservation have shown proven result, especially when shoot to kill policies have been
implemented. Though they risk alienating the local communities if such heavy-handed strategies
such as shoot to kill policies are applied over long periods of time. There needs to be a collective
solution implementing the use of militarized conservation with its technologies, resources, and
training for rangers protecting against those are willing to ignore the laws and beliefs of the
global community, accompanied by the community-based natural resource management
strategies to gain support from local community leaders and populations. New research needs to
be done on ways to find a middle ground or adequate way of combining the two divergent
philosophies to conservation. With individuals on both side working together to find collective
solutions because if protection wildlife “from human beings is the main game, then the better
approach is the one that is more likely to deliver the goods and the other is “ nonsense upon
stilts” (Hadley, 2016).
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Appendix
Country

CITIES
Member

Southern & West Africa

Offense & Penalties
Poaching

Angola

Botswana

Kenya

Mozambique

2013

1978

Penalties of
killing an
Elephant
AOA333,450
(US $3747)

N/A

Illegal Sale
Illegal sale
and
commercial
processing of
Ivory, skins,
meat, rhino
horn and other
products are
prohibited
P5000 fine
and prison
term not
exceeding 5
years
Rhino Horn:
Fine up to
P100, 000 and
Prison for 15
years.

Recent
Changes
(2016) Talks
to pass new
wildlife
protection
laws

Fines of P50,
000 (about US$
6,375) in fines
& a 10 year
prison term
Rhino: Fine up
to P100, 000
and Prison for
15 years

Fines range
from P5000 –
P100000 & 5
– 10 year
prison term

Fine of up to
40,000 KES
(about US$464)
and/or up to 10
years in prison

Fine not
exceeding
10,000 KES
or to
imprisonment
for a term not
exceeding 3
years or to
both

Fine of up to
10,000 KES
(about
US$116)
and/or 1 year
imprisonment

(2013)
Dramatic
increase in
penalties for
wildliferelated
offenses
compared to
the repealed
law.

Fines range
from 2
(US$69.45)
to 100 million
MT
(US$3,472.27)
Fines 10 times

Fines range
from 2
(US$69.45)
to 100 million
MT
(US$3,472.27)
Fines 10 times

Fines range
from 2
(US$69.45)
to 100 million
MT
(US$3,472.27)
Fines 10 times

(2016)

1979

1981

Trafficking

(2014)

Ban
commercial
hunting

Conservation
Law
increased
fines and/or
Prison by 12
to 16 years

56

Namibia

South Africa

Tanzania

Zambia

1991

1975

1980

1981

maximum if
animal
endangered
Fine not
exceeding
R200,000
($15,272)
Prison from 6months to 20
years
Fine from 5
(US
$387,717.650)
to 10 million R
(US
$775435.30)
Prison from 5 –
10 years (both
can be used)

maximum if
animal
endangered
Fine not
exceeding
R200,000
($15,272)
Prison from 6months to 20
years
(Export only)
No minimum
Fine from 5
(US
$387,717.650)
to 10 million
R (US
$775435.30)
Prison from 5
– 10 years
(both can be
used)

maximum if
animal
endangered
Fine not
exceeding
R200,000
($15,272)
Prison from 6months to 20
years
No minimum
Fine from 5
(US
$387,717.650)
to 10 million
R (US
$775435.30)
Prison from 5
– 10 years
(both can be
used)

Fines from
500,000 TZS
(about US$315)
to 2 million
TZS (about
US$1260)
and/or a
Prison from 5 to
10 years

Fine of not
less than twice
the value of
the trophy and
/or Prison for
a term of not
less than 2
years but not
exceeding 5
years

Fine of not
less than twice
the value of
the trophy and
/or Prison for
a term of not
less than 2
years but not
exceeding 5
years

First offence,
Prison of not
less than 5 but
not exceeding
20 years,

First offence,
to a fine of not
less than
150,000 ZMK
(US $28.88)
but not
exceeding
500,000 ZMK
(US $96.25)
and/or Prison
no less than 3
but not more 5

First offence,
Prison 5 to 10
years (no
option of fine)
Second or
subsequent
offence, 7 to
15 years (no
option of fine)

Second or
subsequent
offence, Prison
of not less than
10 but not
exceeding 25

(2004)
NEMBA
(2014)
NNSMESA

(2015)
Zambia
Wildlife Act,
an overhaul
of wildlife
legislation in
its entirety
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Zimbabwe

1981

Country

CITIES
Member

Nepal

India

1975

1976

years

years,
Second or
subsequent
offence, to a
fine of not less
than 200,000
ZMK (US
$38.50) but
not exceeding
600,000 ZMK
(US $115.50)
and/or Prison
no less than 5
but no more
than 7 years

Fines between
level 7-14
Prison from 2 to
20 years

Fines up to
level 14
and/or Prison
up to 20 years

Fines up to
level 6 or
Prison up to 1
year

Asia (Indian subcontinent)

Offense & Penalties
Poaching

Trafficking

Illegal Sale

In nation parks
or Reserves,
Fines up to
1,000,000 NPR
(US $1232.43)
and/or Prison 515 years

In nation
parks or
Reserves,
Fines up to
1,000,000
NPR (US
$1232.43)
and/or Prison
5-15 years
Prison up to 3
years and/or
Fine up to
25,000 for
animals on
Scheduled 1
or Part 2 of
schedule 2 (if
on NP,
demands 3
yrs. & up to 7.

In nation
parks or
Reserves,
Fines up to
1,000,000
NPR (US
$1232.43)
and/or Prison
5-15 years
Prison up to 3
years and/or
Fine up to
25,000 for
animals on
Scheduled 1
or Part 2 of
schedule 2 (if
on NP,
demands 3
yrs. & up to 7.

Prison up to 3
years and/or
Fine up to
25,000 for
animals on
Scheduled 1 or
Part 2 of
schedule 2 (if
on NP,
demands 3 yrs.
& up to 7. Fine

Recent
Changes
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of R 10,000
Country

Cameroon

Chad

C.A.R.

D.R.C

CITIES
Member

1981

1989

1980

Fine of R
Fine of R
10,000
10,000
Central Africa

Offense & Penalties
Poaching

Trafficking

Illegal Sale

Fines from 3 to
10 million CFA
and/or Prison
from 1 to 3
years.
Fines double if
previous
offense or
sworn official
in wildlife or
police officer
N/A
Inside reserve
Prison 1-5 years
and /or Fine
200,000 to 1
million Francs
(US 200-400)

Fines from 3
to 10 million
CFA and/or
Prison from 1
to 3 years.
Fines double
if previous
offense or
sworn official
in wildlife or
police officer
N/A
Inside reserve
Prison 1-5
years and /or
Fine 200,000
to 1 million
Francs (US
200-400)

Fines from 3
to 10 million
CFA and/or
Prison from 1
to 3 years.
Fines double
if previous
offense or
sworn official
in wildlife or
police officer
N/A
N/A

Recent
Changes

No permit –
Prison 1 to 6
months and /or
Fine 100 to 300
Francs
Ivory – Prison 2
to 5 years
and/or 1 to 5
million francs
(US 2,000 –
10,000)

No permit –
Prison 1 to 6
months and
/or Fine 100 to
300 Francs
Ivory – Prison
2 to 5 years
and/or 1 to 5
million francs
(US 2,000 –
10,000)
Prison from 2 to Prison from 2
5 years or
to 5 years or
10,000 to 10
10,000 to 10
million francs
million francs

N/A

1976
Penalties
double if on
restricted
hunting areas or

Penalties
double if on
restricted
hunting areas
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periods.
Fine up to 10
million FCFA
and/ or Prison
from 3 to 6
months
N/A

or periods
Fine up to 10
million FCFA
and/ or Prison
from 3 to 6
months
N/A

N/A
Fine not
exceeding $500
USD or prison
no more than a
year for persons
without
citizenship
Fine Ls 100 or
no more than 6
months

N/A
Fine not
exceeding
$500 USD or
prison no
more than a
year for
persons
without
citizenship
Fine Ls 100 or
no more than
6 months

N/A
N/A

No less than 0
million
shillings or
Uganda
1983
Prison no less
than 7 years/
Fine should
not be less
than specimen
involved
(Law Library of Congress, 2013; Mauck, 2013; DLA Piper, 2015)

N/A

Gabon

1989

Republic of
Congo
Sudan

1983

South Sudan

1982

No less than 1
million shillings
and/or Prison
no more than 5
years/ Fine
shall not be less
than specimens

N/A

N/A
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